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138 1 tHe conteXt
The new global emphasis on public infrastructure for connectivity builds on the 
declarations of the UN Sustainable Development Agenda, and most recently the 
Belt and Road Initiative that seeks to connect global economies and recreate old 
trading links and generate new ones. Infrastructure also holds the key to addressing 
the Middle-Income Trap, along with education and innovation. Yet, there is consid-
erable evidence from the EU, Latin America and China to show that while the 
advantages of connectivity investment are significant and necessary, in isolation 
these are far from sufficient in ensuring more inclusive and sustainable outcomes. 
Sustainable growth involves private investments that are channeled to the most 
promising and productive activities. Of course, firms respond to price signals, but 
with imperfect or incomplete information, tend to reinforce existing profit centers 
where the jobs tend to be concentrated (London, Barcelona, Milan, Shanghai, 
Guangzhou-Shenzhen, Santiago de Chile), typically resulting in increasing 
inequality, congestion and pollution. The resulting conurbations attract migrants, 
and in large metropolitan areas in Latin America and South Asia, there is a sharp 
increase in informality that leads to incentives for cheating that result in low pro-
ductivity (see Levy, 2008). Regional connectivity may not always result in a more 
equal or level playing field and in the cases mentioned above may have exacer-
bated imbalances and inequalities. As seen in the UK, which has experienced a 
strong recovery since the 2008 crisis, the Brexit vote suggests that there may be a 
political backlash if employment and income generation, or adjustment costs, are 
not more evenly distributed. 
In this paper, we argue that a combination of instruments is likely to be needed at 
both national and local levels, including tax handles, and full information, particu-
larly involving liabilities within an intertemporal framework, to ensure sustaina-
ble and inclusive development. Since most of the policies are implemented at the 
sub-national level, local financing, institutions and incentives affect the possibility 
of creating new “growth hubs” or clean and efficient cities that are needed for 
sustainable growth. We draw on evidence from the EU, China and Chile, which is 
considered by the IFIs as one of the leading countries as far as investment man-
agement is concerned. We also use empirical illustrations based on the theory of 
reform applied to the Chilean case to illustrate how to improve on the investment 
allocations that are already praised as arms-length by the Bretton Woods Institu-
tions, to develop a sustainable growth strategy that also addresses the middle-
income trap. This has wider applications in Europe, and China, and in the imple-
mentation of the Belt and Road Initiative.
2 soMe eU eXaMPles
The role that public investment may have in encouraging cross-border and regional 
connectivity has long been a focus of EU policy. Structural funds have been used 
to finance transport links – including in Motorways and High Speed rail links. 
This is to facilitate the encouragement of private sector investment and activities 
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139One of the main components of a sustainable development strategy is based on 
clean new cities, or revamped older cities, at some distance from the existing 
metropolitan hubs. As the EC experience shows, connectivity is necessary but not 
sufficient in creating hubs. 
The UK has some of the best connectivity in Europe, with North-South train and 
motorway links, as well as international airports. However, as the recent Eurostat 
report shows, this has not been sufficient to prevent the highest inequality among 
European cities – by far exceeding that in any other country on the Continent. The 
connectivity only increased the migratory pressures towards the capital, London. 
It also explains the Brexit vote in England and Wales, except for London which 
benefitted from and voted overwhelmingly to stay in the EU. 
In the UK, overall growth over the past decade was facilitated by the growth of the 
financial services industry, particularly in the Greater London area. However, this 
did not compensate for the failing coal industry in Wales (despite funding from the 
EC), or the defunct shipbuilding and textiles in the North of England and virtual 
closure of the automobile industry in the Midlands. The political backlash was felt 
only with the Brexit vote that took the government by surprise.
Similarly, in Italy, the development of the services sector in Milan has not compen-
sated for the closure of the automobile and textile sector in nearby Turin. Further, 
the investment in the North-South high speed train and Autostrada links, between 
Turin to Milan to Rome to Naples has not resulted in rebalancing, e.g., in Turin or 
in Naples. It just means that it is easier for people to commute from Turin to Milan. 
Regional inequalities continue to increase, with the lagging South of Italy severely 
constrained in using the new infrastructure or attracting complementary private-
sector investment (see e.g., Ahmad, Bordingnon and Brosio, 2016). 
In many cases, local governments have tried to capitalize on perceived rents 
associated with the infrastructure projects, often to engage in real estate or tourism 
development. This has been facilitated by poor accounting for PPPs, as well as an 
ability to hide transactions by contracting from local banks (see e.g., the case of 
Madeira). The hidden liabilities exacerbated the extent and depth of the crisis. And, 
as in Spain and Ireland, private liabilities were quickly transformed into public li-
abilities as the crisis hit, forcing a public charge to rescue the local cajas (banks).
It is by no means certain that new connectivity will lead to additional activity and 
employment in depressed areas, and further imbalances are possible without 
additional local investments and enhanced service delivery. The lessons from the 
crisis in Europe are that local accountability matters, both in terms of own-source 
revenues and effective service delivery for the generation of sustainable hubs. 
Further, full information on transactions, including PPPs, is needed to avoid rent-
seeking behavior and game play across levels of government. Without full 
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140 neither yardstick competition, nor effective implementation of subnational fiscal 
rules can be assured. In this regard, the absence of EU standards and requirements 
for information generation pose a significant problem, including for the private 
sector. Risk management becomes more complicated as private liabilities can be 
transformed into public debt in a very short period of time. 
The EU experience is of relevance for the SDG investment agenda, as well as the 
Belt and Road initiative.
3 soMe cHInese PeRsPectIVes
The 1993/4 reforms focused on a centralization of tax instruments in a newly cre-
ated (central) State Administration of Taxation (SAT), with a sharing of the VAT, 
and an equalization transfer system. However, a “revenue-returned” component 
provided the basis for the consolidation and expansion of the “coastal hubs”, 
because of the limited connectivity infrastructure inland. Given the relatively low, 
albeit relatively equally distributed individual incomes in the aftermath of the 
Cultural Revolution, an increase in income dispersion was a consequence of the 
growth process and a driving factor for the migration to the coastal hubs (see 
Ahmad and Wang, 1991). While this strategy was criticized by some of China’s 
Development Partners as likely to generate spatial inequalities, it was the only 
feasible mechanism to maintain double digit growth over two decades, and pro-
vide more or less full employment opportunities with improving productivity and 
enhanced complexity of the economy. Over 150 million workers released from 
agriculture and low value added activities in the interior of the country moved to 
more productive activities along the coast. And over 700 million people were 
taken out of poverty in two decades (out of a global total of around 750 million 
during this period) driven by the strategy of developing the coastal “hubs”. 
However, widening personal income and regional disparities pose problems for 
the long-term sustainability of the Chinese development strategy. As pointed out 
in IMF (2016), the increase in the Chinese level of inequality has been particu-
larly high – rising from around 0.4 in 1992 to around .52 in 2013. This is now at 
levels in the market-based emerging economies in Latin America, such as Chile, 
that have relied on the service sector to generate additional employment opportu-
nities. Given the implicit social contract in China, high levels of inequality are 
likely to be less sustainable than in Chile, although the absence of adequate 
employment opportunities have begun to pose problems in Chile. 
A major consequence of the success of the coastal hub phenomenon in China (as 
in Chile) is the high level of pollution and congestion in the metropolitan areas, 
e.g., Beijing, Guangzhou-Shenzhen, Hangzhou-Shanghai corridor. The conges-
tion makes it costlier to do business. And rising pollution levels seriously degrade 
the quality of life. Beijing’s fine particle air pollution level remains well above 
acceptable health standards despite constant high-level political attention that has 
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141A part of the solution to the problems of success in the coastal growth strategy is to 
move production inland, closer to population concentrations and sources of raw 
materials, through the creation of smaller inland urban “hubs” that are less depend-
ent on fossil fuels for transportation needs and where the choice of techniques 
adequately reflects social costs and benefits. The existing metropolitan areas could 
then be transformed into clusters of “clean” high-tech and service sectors. 
The Chinese “Western region development strategy” over the past decade, how-
ever, had limited success, largely because of the higher cost of production and 
exports. The cost-differential will change with the enhanced public investment in 
cross-border connectivity with the Belt and Road links to the Middle East, Central 
Asia, Africa and Europe. Just the opening-up of existing rail and road links have 
made it possible for the first train from Zhejiang province to arrive in Teheran in 
14 days using the Western Khorgos hub, as opposed to the 45 days it takes by the 
sea route. This is significant in view of the rapidly increasing trade between the 
two countries, increasing from $4 bn in 2003, to $51bn in 2014, and projected to 
increase to $600bn in ten years. The deep-sea port of Gwadar, along with road, rail 
and pipeline links with Xinjiang will similarly open the markets in the Middle 
East and East and North Africa – eliminating the cost disadvantages faced by the 
Chinese interior provinces vis à vis the coastal hubs.
The creation of new internal hubs in China has been constrained by the absence of 
adequate instruments – this includes own-source revenues at the local level, with 
the failure of the property tax experiments in Shanghai and Chongqing – and full 
information on local transactions and the buildup of liabilities (see Ahmad and 
Zhang, 2017). While a system of local bonds has been introduced, with-
out the anchor of own-source local revenues, it is unlikely to provide the right 
incentives to markets, or resolve the issue of local liabilities in an inter-temporal 
perspective, or to make for sustainable new hubs. 
4 PUblIc InVestMent foR sUstaInable GRoWtH 
4.1 MetHoD
The use of economy-wide shadow prices1 allows for the general effects of public 
interventions to be assessed, shedding light on the sectors more suitable for 
reforms, taking into account effects on households, producers, and government. 
Given that a range of shadow prices is feasible, a choice based on government 
preferences for a clean economy and inclusive growth should be the basis for the 
specific choice of shadow prices. This is then reflected in the consistent selection 
of projects at the national and local levels – leading to the choice of sustainable 
hubs and employment generation.
Following Drèze and Stern (1987) and Ahmad and Stern (1991), the government 
assesses projects based on preferences among different states of the economy 
reflecting valuations of environmental costs, as well as distributional characteris-
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142 tics. The decisions are made based on maximizing a welfare function subject to 
market clearing restrictions and evaluated at shadow prices. The planners’ objec-
tive function (V) takes the Bergson-Samuelson form, and the social welfare func-
tion depends on household consumption levels. Consumption is a function of 
prices, income, taxes, and demand and supply constraints. Therefore, the aggre-
gated utility of any project is calculated as the welfare-weighted sum of individu-
als’ marginal willingness to pay for the project. The objective function can be 
more general and include a variety of objectives that reflect the government’s 
perspectives, say, on environmental damage.
 Max V (s,w), subject to E (s,w) = z  (1)
V(s,w) is the social welfare function, which depends on endogenous variables (s) 
and exogenous variables (w). The maximization problem can be solved using the 
Lagrangian:
 L (s,w) = V (s,w) – v' [E (s,w) – z]  (2)
where v' represents the shadow price or the increase in the value of social welfare 
function when an extra unit of public output is available (the social opportunity 
cost). The first order conditions to maximize the function imply that the net effect 
on welfare due to variations in (s) or (w) includes the costs related to changes in 
demand evaluated at shadow prices.
  (3)
Once the vector of responses is defined, it is possible to assess how private agents 
would respond (which is reflected in changes in net demand and supply) and the 
consequent effects on their utility function. 
The shadow cost,  of the extra demand can also be represented as the differ-
ence between p’y (actual profits) and q’x (household expenditures), which repre-
sents government tax revenues (Rv). The shadow cost may be rewritten as
  (4)
The total effect on welfare can be seen as the direct change in welfare plus the 
change in shadow revenue, representing the general equilibrium adjustments 
associated with the reform. This method can be used in a broad set of applications, 
and for this case, including tax reforms as shown by Ahmad and Stern (1984). In this 
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143Considering derivatives hold lump-sum incomes constant, and that q=p−t, and 
assuming that producer prices are proportional to shadow prices equation (5) can 
be rewritten as:
  (6)
   (7)
If equation (7) is greater than 0, social welfare is increased by raising the ith tax or 
increasing its price. Declines in social welfare are offset by the extra revenue raised.
The value of γ can be used to identify directions of reform.
  (8)
, where βh represents the social marginal utility of income for 
households, and xi is demand for commodity i by household h, and  
can be represented as variations in consumption due to changes in taxes or public 
supplies at shadow prices.
This method has the advantage of incorporating the degree of inequality aversion 
in the welfare function by assigning different weights to the additional consump-
tion by groups at different levels of income. A high degree of interpersonal ine-
quality aversion is also expected to favor lagging regions. The effects of a project 
on the welfare function depend on the social marginal utility of household expen-
ditures and the demand for each commodity by households.
While there are several ways to estimate the welfare weights, this proposal uses 
the method proposed by Ahmad and Stern (1984). The welfare weights are nor-
malized to the welfare weight for the poorest household (unity) and adjusted by an 
inequality aversion parameter so that a marginal expenditure by the rich is less 
valuable than that by the poor.
  (9)
I h is the per-capita expenditure of the hth household and I 1 is the normalized wel-
fare weight of the poorest household. Therefore, βh represents the marginal social 
value of a unit of expenditure to household h relative to household 1. The param-
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144 that a unit of income to the richest is seen as equivalent to a unit received by the 
poorest; e=1 indicates that, if I h is twice I 1 then a marginal unit to h is worth half 
that to household 1, and so forth.
Applying Drèze and Stern (1987) and the related theory of reform enunciated by 
Ahmad and Stern (1984, 1991) requires:
– market prices to be converted to the shadow prices needed to assess secto-
ral social profitability. The method extends the Little and Mirrlees (1974) 
approach; and
– the corresponding changes in taxes/relative prices that need to generate 
and support welfare-improving structural reforms to be evaluated using 
estimates of household responses.
The Ahmad and Stern (1984, 1991) and Drèze and Stern (1987) methods permit 
different scenarios using different inequality aversion parameters. The shadow 
prices also permit a set of additional objectives linked, for example, to a sustain-
able development agenda. 
The accounting ratios calculated to incorporate inequality aversion parameters 
given by equation (9) and the cross-industry effects by using economy-wide shad-
ow prices generate alternative patterns of public investment allocations. Account-
ing ratios linked to the development agenda, and estimated taking into account 
general effects on the economy, should favor economic convergence and sustain-
able growth. 
In addition, economy-wide accounting ratios provide directions for tax reform, 
giving policymakers a tool that links government revenues and the effects of con-
sumption and production patterns, and generates incentives for good governance. 
The tax reforms are needed to “lock” in place the incentives facing key actors in 
the economy – including firms and households. The tax reforms, such as for local 
own-source revenues, also require an equalization transfer framework to enable 
all regions to provide similar levels of service at similar levels of tax effort, to 
facilitate effective local service delivery in the new growth hubs. An equalization 
framework was adopted in China following the 1994 reforms, but does not apply 
in Chile or most Latin American countries.
4.2 IllUstRatIons foR cHIle
Over the past two decades, Chile has been among the top Latin American per-
formers in terms of macroeconomic management – with a low stock of debt (21% 
of GDP, which involved a doubling since 2010), low deficits, a SWF, tax/GDP 
ratio of around 18% – or within the range suggested for the MDGs, and a private-
sector oriented policy stance. This is bolstered by the arms-length and uniform 
approach to public investment, through the National Investment System (SNI), 
and a transparent procurement process, Chile Compras – both praised by the IFIs 
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145Growth has exceeded that in neighboring countries, including during the crisis pe-
riod since 2010 (IMF, 2016). It has also led to significant overall reductions in 
poverty over a twenty-year period. However, the growth has been largely sustained 
by commodity exports, especially copper and agricultural raw materials, especially 
to China in the recent decade, offsetting declining productivity growth. The result 
has been what President Ricardo Lago (2013) called the “middle income trap”. As 
is common in primary commodity exporting countries, there has been limited de-
velopment of domestic linkages. This is reflected in the very limited economic 
complexity, lower than it was twenty years earlier, and is symptomatic of the gre-
ater reliance on primary commodity exports and a Dutch Disease effect. In relative 
terms, the negative value of the economic complexity index shows that the full 
economic potential has not been realized (Hausman et al., 2016). This has left the 
country exposed to external shocks, and Chile is particularly vulnerable to shifts in 
demand for its copper exports, especially from China (IMF, 2016). This clearly has 
an impact on the pattern of employment opportunities, and social cohesion.
Another consequence of the growth and investment strategy is the concentration 
of activities in the ports, and Metropolitan zone, including Santiago, despite the 
investment of the North-South Highway. Regional disparities are high, and there 
is increasing congestion and pollution in the Metropolitan Zone. Migrants from 
the less well-off regions head to the Metropolitan Zone, because that’s where the 
jobs are, given the limited diversification of the economy to provide sustainable 
employment generation. This causes crowding in peripheral shantytowns with 
poor facilities, including for education and other public services. A striking char-
acteristic of Chile is the increasing concentration and population pressure in the 
Metropolitan areas. This also results in choking growth potential and contributing 
to the middle-income trap. 
The regional imbalances also led to persistent pockets of poverty in the lagging 
regions. There was an increasing incidence of poverty in 20 of 26 functional urban 
areas,2 again with a clear regional pattern. More worryingly, the largest concentra-
tion of the poor (40% of the total) is in the Metropolitan area, although it has the 
highest per capita incomes and employment opportunities. The income inequali-
ties are magnified by the inequalities in access to public services (CASEN, 2015). 
This is also reflected in the provision of tertiary education, for which there is 
limited public funding. Consequently, interpersonal inequalities are also increasing, 
the Gini coefficient in Chile well above the OECD levels.3 Addressing interper-
sonal inequalities depends on a more effective operation of the personal income 
tax. Given its poor performance in Latin America, generating additional third 
party information from asset holding, particularly property, suggests the impor-
tance of a regional/local surcharge or “piggy-back”. However, for this not to 
widen inter-regional inequalities, an equalization framework is needed (Ahmad, 
Letelier and Ormeño, 2016 and forthcoming). 
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146 Regional connectivity, in the form of the North-South Highway in Chile is impor-
tant and will certainly play a major role in the future. However, it has not reduced 
regional inequalities, as the preconditions for local “hubs” outside the Metropoli-
tan areas are not met – including the provision of basic services and adequate 
own-source financing to generate incentives for the local governments to provide 
adequate supporting infrastructure for private sector activities. This reflect the 
problems have been observed with the connectivity infrastructure in the EU – e.g., 
in Spain and Italy – as described above. Without the creation of the new “hubs”, 
or clean new cities, regional inequalities might increase. 
The recent development of solar energy in Chile, providing some of the cheapest 
forms of clean power, also open-up the potential for generating new hubs, if the 
local preconditions are created. The Chilean examples also have some relevance 
for the rebalancing in China, and the Belt and Road Initiative focusing on cross-
border connectivity in Asia and Africa.
DIseQUalIZInG Role of InVestMent allocatIons?
Chile’s national system of investment appraisal, SNI, vets all public projects. This 
performs well against the investment criteria of the IFIs (see assessment for Chile 
in World Bank, 2006). However, the project selection criteria are largely based on 
market criteria (see table 1) – including interest rates and accounting rations that 
do not take adequate account of externalities, or inequalities. There is an attempt 
to incorporate the cost of carbon emissions, but without full economy-wide impli-
cations. It is not surprising that market based criteria would lead to a concentration 
of activities in the most profitable sectors and in regions that are well endowed 
with connectivity and public services. The public investment could be comple-
menting private sector activities in the more advanced regions, leading to the mi-
gration to the Metropolitan areas and greater inequality in employment opportuni-
ties and incomes, as well as in the access to public services as pointed out above.
Table 1
SNI project selection parameters
Goods/inputs conversion factor
Social discount rate 6% (8% and 12% in previous years)
Exchange rate 1.01
Emissions (CO2) 2.213 pesos per ton of equivalent carbon emission
Land Market value (without any correction)
Domestic goods  
and inputs Market value – VAT
Importable materials (Market value-duties) x currency conversion factor
Fuels Depends on type of fuel and vehicle
High-skill labor Market value x factor of conversion for high-skilled labor (0.98)
Medium-skill labor Market value x factor of conversion for mid-skilled labor (0.68)
Low-skill labor Market value x factor of conversion for low-skilled labor (0.62)
General expenses  
and profits Market value – VAT
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147The complexity analysis suggests the need for diversification but does not clarify 
what sectors should be pursued or where, or the role of public policy in achieving 
this. We focus here on the role of economy-wide shadow prices, drawing on Ah-
mad and Viscarra (2016) and follow-up work with the SNI supported by the Inter-
American Development Bank.
enHancInG tHe snI
We draw here on work with the SNI to make the investment system more reflec-
tive of the sustainable development and climate change agenda that both the cur-
rent Bachelet Administration and its predecessor have subscribed to (see Ahmad 
and Viscarra, 2016). Project choices and tax/public pricing decisions are inextrica-
bly linked and this is seen most clearly with environmental concerns, and income 
distribution.
The method permits the examination of economy-wide or inter-industry effects of 
changes in public supplies or taxes/public prices. It also facilitates the potential 
effects on households in different circumstances and on firms. While this is at the 
heart of the theory of reform (and is much simpler to estimate than an optimal tax 
framework) it can form the basis for an evaluation of gainers and losers needed for 
a political economy assessment that also includes governments at different levels. 
While the institutional arrangements vary from country to country, and must be 
kept in mind, the approach is general enough to be applicable in Chile, Senegal, 
India or Pakistan, or even China.
In principle, there are a multitude of shadow prices corresponding to various as-
sumptions about traded (importables or exportables) and non-traded goods, the 
marginal social cost of public funds, and the accounting ratios for different types 
of labour, capital, and land. 
Ahmad and Viscarra (2016) illustrate the method of economy-wide shadow prices 
for Chile and examine what happens with a number of permutations in the key 
variables (some of the variance in Accounting Ratios (ARs) is reported in table 2 
for a set of scenarios based on assumptions concerning sectors (IM, EX and NT) 
and factor inputs.
It is clear from the table 2 that the precise assumptions used will matter in relation 
to the resulting sectoral accounting ratios, and hence the choice and rankings of 
the projects to the chosen. While there are clear differences across the sets of 
assumptions, the general pattern emerging from the simulations is that the highest 
accounting ratios are for the higher linkage (especially in terms of potential 
employment generation, and higher value added sectors). This is consistent with 
the Hausman et al. Complexity story for Chile, that suggests the importance of 
diversification. The economy-wide shadow prices indicate some priorities for 





















































41 (2) 137-157 (2017)
148 Table 2

































cereals IM 0.986 0.986 0.986 0.986 0.986 0.986 0.986 0.986 0.986
Vegetables EX 0.934 0.929 0.929 0.935 0.931 0.93 0.936 0.932 0.932
Fruits EX 0.541 0.538 0.537 0.542 0.539 0.539 0.543 0.54 0.539
Meats, sausages IM 0.988 0.988 0.988 0.988 0.988 0.988 0.988 0.988 0.988
Dairy products, 
cheese, eggs NT 0.988 1.134 1.208 0.954 1.074 1.174 0.927 1.047 1.147




EX 0.985 0.982 0.981 0.986 0.983 0.982 0.987 0.984 0.983
Animal feed NT 0.635 0.755 0.86 0.611 0.73 0.836 0.591 0.711 0.816
Fuels IM 0.991 0.991 0.991 0.991 0.991 0.991 0.991 0.991 0.991
Other food 
products IM 0.977 0.977 0.977 0.977 0.977 0.977 0.977 0.977 0.977
Liquor EX 0.961 0.953 0.952 0.965 0.956 0.955 0.967 0.958 0.957
Non-alcoholic 
beverages NT 0.550 0.661 0.682 0.513 0.625 0.645 0.484 0.595 0.616









IM 0.949 0.949 0.949 0.949 0.949 0.949 0.949 0.949 0.949
Stationery, 
office supplies EX 0.975 0.969 0.968 0.977 0.971 0.97 0.978 0.973 0.972
Printing, 
publishing NT 0.653 0.846 1.014 0.63 0.823 0.991 0.611 0.805 0.973
Pharmaceutical 
products NT 0.678 0.856 0.888 0.652 0.829 0.861 0.631 0.808 0.84
Toiletries, 


















NT 0.692 0.853 0.87 0.675 0.837 0.853 0.662 0.824 0.84

























































































NT 0.563 0.686 0.793 0.54 0.662 0.77 0.521 0.644 0.751
Electricity NT 1.051 1.111 1.121 0.784 0.845 0.855 0.569 0.63 0.64
Gas supply IM 0.995 0.995 0.995 0.995 0.995 0.995 0.995 0.995 0.995
Basic public 




NT 0.732 0.936 0.969 0.71 0.913 0.946 0.691 0.894 0.927
Hotels, 
restaurants NT 1.036 1.232 1.389 0.999 1.193 1.352 0.968 1.163 1.321
Transportation NT 0.645 0.79 0.811 0.593 0.738 0.759 0.55 0.696 0.717
Mail, courier 
services NT 0.541 0.758 0.938 0.509 0.725 0.905 0.482 0.699 0.879
Telephone 
services NT 0.877 1.026 1.059 0.72 0.868 0.902 0.593 0.741 0.775
Financial 




NT 0.706 0.893 0.918 0.651 0.838 0.863 0.607 0.794 0.819
Services to 




NT 1.026 1.031 1.032 0.702 0.708 0.708 0.441 0.446 0.447
Education NT 0.820 1.066 1.091 0.793 1.039 1.064 0.772 1.018 1.043
Medical, health 
services NT 0.768 0.985 1.011 0.735 0.952 0.978 0.708 0.926 0.952
Entertainment NT 0.673 0.911 1.121 0.621 0.859 1.069 0.579 0.817 1.027
Other services NT 0.217 0.282 0.336 0.191 0.256 0.31 0.17 0.235 0.288
Mining EX 0.981 0.976 0.976 0.982 0.978 0.977 0.983 0.979 0.978
Construction NT 0.563 0.713 0.845 0.543 0.693 0.824 0.526 0.676 0.807
Commerce NT 0.553 0.734 0.87 0.518 0.699 0.834 0.489 0.67 0.806
Chemical 
industry IM 0.989 0.989 0.989 0.989 0.989 0.989 0.989 0.989 0.989
Basic industry 
metals EX 0.974 0.97 0.969 0.976 0.972 0.971 0.977 0.973 0.972
L = low-skilled labor; M = medium-skilled labor; H = high-skilled labor, K = capital,  
IM = importable sectors; EX = exportable sectors; NT = non-tradable sectors.
Source: Ahmad and Viscarra (2016). Calculations based on the input-output matrix 2008, Central 
Bank of Chile.
Interestingly, sensitivity to various levels of a “carbon tax” results does not change 
the social profitability of sectors, but results in changes within the accounting 
rations for each set of assumptions.4 This implies that there will be changes in the 
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150 choice of techniques within the sectoral prioritization, although the overall recom-
mendation for diversification for more sustainable employment generation 
remains robust.
Many of the parameters to choose among the wide range of shadow prices will be 
determined by the governments medium-term macro-fiscal or sustainable growth 
strategy. This will help to fix the key assumptions to be used in the project selec-
tion process, including the choice of the social discount rate. In our view, greater 
precision is needed especially with respect to tax policy at the national and subna-
tional levels.
Table 3
Chile: social profitability of different sectors
Groups





























cereals 0.404 0.409 0.321 0.435 0.445 0.351 0.459 0.470 0.376
Vegetables 0.395 0.380 0.316 0.430 0.426 0.351 0.458 0.454 0.379
Fruits -0.030 -0.089 -0.317 0.046 0.006 -0.240 0.108 0.067 -0.178
Meats, 
sausages 0.255 0.260 0.182 0.280 0.299 0.207 0.301 0.320 0.227




0.228 0.242 0.154 0.244 0.257 0.170 0.257 0.270 0.183
Fuels 0.847 0.852 0.837 0.864 0.869 0.854 0.877 0.882 0.868
Other food 
products 0.523 0.535 0.461 0.546 0.557 0.482 0.563 0.574 0.499









0.451 0.460 0.383 0.479 0.488 0.411 0.502 0.510 0.433
Stationery, 
office supplies 0.478 0.502 0.398 0.514 0.538 0.435 0.544 0.567 0.465
Mining 0.538 0.545 0.512 0.596 0.603 0.569 0.643 0.649 0.616
Chemical 
industry 0.527 0.539 0.505 0.568 0.580 0.547 0.601 0.613 0.586
Basic industry 
metals 0.491 0.496 0.455 0.509 0.513 0.472 0.523 0.527 0.493
Source: Ahmad and Viscarra (2016). A number of simulations were carried out with alternative 
assumptions concerning the tradable and non-tradable sectors.
Ahmad and Viscarra (2016) use the theory of reform (see Ahmad and Stern, 1991) 
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151This evaluates the social marginal cost of raising a peso/$ on firms (through the 
shadow prices) and households (using a household income and expenditure sur-
vey), and are evaluated using complete demand systems (estimated by Ahmad and 
Viscarra, 2016) and estimated for various degrees of inequality aversion (Atkin-
son index, ε of 0 is what is currently in place with SNI – a peso to the poorest is 
evaluated as the same as a peso to the richest group in the country; and Atkinson 
index of ε = 5 puts almost all the weight on the lowest groups of the population. 
Rankings of the social marginal cost for various levels of ε are shown in table 4. 
Details of the directions of reform are explained in Ahmad and Viscarra (2016). 
For our purposes, we illustrate how the method would work in practice. The basis 
of the tax system would be a VAT on all transactions that generates production 
efficiency – business to business transactions are credited, and exports are zero-
rated (all tax on earlier stages removed). 
Table 4 
Chile social marginal cost ranking for different inequality parameters
Groups e = 0 e = 0.5 e = 1 e = 2 e = 5
Rents (houses, apartments) 1 1 1 1 1
Transportation 2 3 15 21 19
Other services 3 17 24 24 24
education 4 23 25 25 25
Telephone services 5 16 22 23 23
Hotels, restaurants 6 11 16 18 18
Textiles, clothing, footwear 7 7 12 14 8
Health 8 13 18 16 10
Meats, sausages 9 5 4 6 9
Public basic services 10 2 2 2 2
Financial services 11 14 17 15 14
Flour, pasta, cereals 12 6 5 17 17
Entertainment 13 26 26 26 27
Electricity 14 4 3 5 7
Vegetables 15 9 11 12 15
Non-alcoholic beverages 16 8 7 7 6
Pharmaceutical products 17 21 21 20 20
Dairy products, cheese, eggs 18 10 10 11 13
Other food products 19 19 20 19 22
Gas 20 12 8 10 12
Liquor 21 15 6 3 3
Fruits 22 18 13 8 5
tobacco 23 25 23 22 21
toiletries, cosmetics 24 27 27 27 26
Fish, crustaceans, mollusks 25 20 9 4 4
Oils, fats 26 22 14 9 16
fuels 27 24 19 13 11
Source: Ahmad and Viscarra (2106). Note 1 is the highest rank social cost, and least attractive to 
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152 The required differentiation, say for tobacco and cosmetics, comes through addi-
tional excises, or in the case of fuels, a carbon tax. As seen in the first column of 
table 4, fuels are attractive from the perspective of the theory reform and are the 
most attractive sector for additional taxation. The rankings change as the Atkinson 
index increases, as even the poor consume fuels. However, from a sustainable 
development perspective, one would still want to tax carbon, and some compensa-
tion for the poor needs to be sought. This is a different situation from that pertain-
ing to basic public services that becomes one of the least attractive sectors to tax 
as inequality aversion increases even slightly – the issue is discussed further in 
Ahmad (2017). The importance of housing and basic public services that arises 
from the directions of reform analysis meshes nicely with the issue of who is to 
provide these, especially for sustainable local “hubs”. 
Education might appear to be a paradoxical sector to tax. However, given the 
characteristics of the household income and expenditure surveys (CASEN), the 
poorer groups do not pay for education, whereas mainly the rich families in Chile 
pay fees. Subjecting the sector to a VAT, for example, would effectively zero-rate 
public education, whereas the private sector providing expensive fee paying 
instruction would be appropriately taxed. Taxation of education, consequently, 
would be equality enhancing.
URban HUbs – “neW clean cItIes?”
Chile has a huge potential to develop new clean cities or hubs, given the success 
it has had with renewable energy. Costs for solar energy have dropped precipi-
tously – and in 37 winning auctions (2013-16), Chile had one of the lowest bids in 
the world at US 2.9 cents/kWh – and this compares with 18.4 cents/kWh in 
Indonesia, and 6.5 cents/kWh in Brazil and South Africa (Monari, 2017). This 
presents a huge technological advantage and could be the true “game changer”. 
However, as with the issue of road and rail connectivity, much depends on both 
the tax agenda and the local service delivery needed to make new “hubs”, or clean 
cities, feasible.
The essence of “convergence” is the faster growth of lagging regions to begin to 
catch up with the advanced regions in terms of per capita incomes and employ-
ment generation capabilities. This is largely driven by the private sector, although 
the public sector has a major role to play in relation to investments in human and 
physical capital. To some extent, convergence is already taking place in Chile, as 
we shall see below, but largely due to slowing growth rates in the Metropolitan 
areas – due to capacity constraints and congestion, as well as the economic slow-
down since 2008 due to the international crisis. This is also a manifestation of the 
“middle income trap” facing Chile as well as other emerging market economies, 
such as China, and the challenge of maintaining sustainable growth and employ-
ment generation. Indeed, the coefficients for investment appear to change sign, 
potentially reflecting the continued level of relatively high public spending, offset 
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153The role of public investments would be largely to facilitate private investment in 
sustainable “hubs” that reflect the comparative advantages of the country, and 
provides sustainable employment generation. A convergence of growth rates with 
sustainable development, throughout the country, clearly requires a better distri-
bution as well as utilization of “enabling” public investments in physical and 
human capital. The role of the regional tier is important, and has been the basis for 
the current discussion in Chile (see Granados and Rodríguez, 2013). 
Interior “sustainable” hubs are possible provided they optimize sources of supply 
(including a skilled labor force), as well as potential demand (domestic consumers 
as well as exports. Measures such as cash transfers to the poor may not close re-
gional “gaps” or even reduce poverty (as in Chiapas, Mexico – see Ahmad, 2015). 
Tax breaks may do little other than to create holes in the tax system that can be 
abused without generating sustainable private investment. Consequently, it is 
important to align the incentives for the private sector, as well as workers, to ensure 
that investments lead to sustained growth of employment opportunities without the 
need for continued preferences or “holes in the tax system” that lead to cheating.
WHeRe to PUt tHe HUbs?
One can think of the current Chilean growth strategy as concentrated in the 
Metropolitan areas and the ports – for simplicity let’s call them A. Given existing 
transport links, f, the furthest peripheral areas P (at distance f from A), are also 
able to utilize the export and demand patters generated by A. This leaves the 
extreme periphery PN, or the zonas rezagadas, as unable to connect either to mar-
kets or domestic or external supply chains.
A characteristic of PN is that the infrastructure gaps are binding. Consequently, 
giving a tax holiday will lead to a perpetual subsidy, but may not be enough to en-
sure that the private sector will have an incentive to invest there. Similarly, a cash 
transfer to the poor in PN likely means that they will migrate to the metropolitan 
areas, A, in search of work, as there is not much to be had in and around PN.
New “sustainable growth hubs” would typically focus on regional comparative 
advantage – and as mentioned above, this has changed significantly with the 
breakthrough in cheap and clean solar energy. This is also a function of both avail-
ability of requisite skills, as well as wider connectivity to domestic and external 
markets or suppliers, as well as local connectivity to the hinterland – this would 
be in diversified industries benefitting from cheap energy, agriculture or as in 
Chile’s case, tourism. Consequently, the nature of the hubs will vary according to 
the relevant endowments. 
Investment in human capital and infrastructure will change the endowments, as 
well as perceptions by the private sector. Some of the “hubs” may be in the remote 
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154 A, and thus opening the disadvantaged zone PN. In Chile, addressing most of the 
backward zones may well involve such “hubs” in the interior. 
It should be noted that given the topological constraints in Chile, the objectives of 
sustainable growth might also include “hubs” that are closer to the existing pro-
duction/export zones A than to PN, but may nonetheless extend the reach of the 
markets to PN. An example of such an “intermediate hub” is Querétaro, which has 
a first-rate university, and this has generated hi-tech industries including aero-
space. It is a relatively small town, without the congestion and pollution of Mexico 
City, and its excellent transport linkages ensure that both workers and products 
contribute to the growing supply chains.
The placement of investments is in turn a function of project selection methods. 
There is the case of the famous Chacao Channel Bridge that was initiated under 
the Ricardo Lagos regime to open Chiloé Island, but later cancelled as the cost-
benefit analysis indicated insufficient demand and traffic. However, the demand 
itself is a function of the bridge, and past trends would not have been appropriate 
as an indicator of future demands. This brings us back to the issue of choice of 
techniques, and social cost benefit analysis in determining how resources are to be 
allocated.
Of course, true convergence is only established if the private sector responds 
effectively as production costs for producers are reduced with improvement in 
connectivity. Typically, measures to reduce the cost-differential would be accom-
panied by taxes and regulations that create incentives to move out of congested 
and polluted areas. 
5 PolIcY IMPlIcatIons
The discussion of the investment story in Chile, together with the evidence from 





2)  there is a need for coordinated policy actions (see chart 1) that links 
investment design to tax policy, local urban hubs/clean cities; and effective 
provision of public services.
3)  Investment priorities, with economy-wide shadow prices linked to a sustain-
able growth strategy, are the starting point for the overall policy framework. 
4)  Investment priorities should be supplemented by a national tax policy 
framework, and we have already identified both a VAT and a carbon tax as ele-
ments that provide financing, reduce distortions and create the right incentives 
for public action. China has completed the full integration of the VAT on goods 
and services in 2016 to reduce the costs of doing business – and India is trying 




















































41 (2) 137-157 (2017)
1555)  the national tax agenda needs to be supplemented by a local tax system. As 
in the case of China or South Asia, a higher carbon tax might be justified in the 
Metropolitan areas that are subject to congestion and pollution – and this could 
be achieved with a piggy-back on the national tax (Ahmad and Stern, 2011). 
The need for a local tax system, even if relatively small in terms of the overall 
revenues generated, is quite significant at the local level in influencing incentives 
facing firms, workers and most importantly, creating hard-budget constraints for 
local governments. The property tax does not function well at the local level in 
most emerging market economies, and the generation of alternative mechanisms 
for emerging market economies is an important ingredient in a sustainable invest-
ment agenda (Ahmad, Brosio and Pöschl, 2015; and Ahmad and Brosio, 2017 for 
an application to Sénégal).
6)  own-source revenues are needed at the local level also to anchor local 
access to credit. Without some local control over rates (e.g., within a band set 
by the National legislature in unitary countries – see Ahmad, 2017 for a discus-
sion of China), it would be highly premature to create a local bond market, 
that would however be very helpful in due course. 
CharT 1
Investment and multilevel taxation linkages
•  Tax reforms structural 
reforms (at national  
and local levels)
•  Avoid “Middle income trap”
•  Economic and social 
convergence
•  Diversification
• Pollution and congestion
Investment strategy:
Appropriate AR for K and L
Inequality aversion (Atkinson index)
Intersectoral analysis
Appropriate cost of public funds 
(discount rate)
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